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Abstract
This paper investigates the eect of dierent risk attitudes on the
nancial decisions of two insiders trading in the stock market. We
consider a static version of the Kyle (1985) model with two insiders.
Insider 1 is risk neutral while insider 2 is risk averse with negative
exponential utility. First, we prove the existence of a unique linear
equilibrium. Second, we obtain somewhat surprising results on how
the risk attitudes aect the market liquidity, the price eciency, when
we carry out a comparative static analysis with respect to Tighe (1989)
and Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) models.
JEL classication: G14, D82
Keywords: Insider trading, Risk neutrality, Risk aversion, Exponential
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1 Introduction
Investors' tolerance toward risk plays a central role in their investments de-
cisions. Most of the research literature about the investors' risk tolerance,
considered two types of risk tolerance: risk-neutral investors and risk-averse
investors. In the market microstructure literature, and more specically in
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Kyle (1985) model and its extensions, majority of the insiders were supposed
to be risk-neutral.1 However, there are considerable research papers, either
theoretical or empirical, on the risk-aversion of the insiders in the nancial
markets.
Few extensions considered the risk-aversion case of the Kyle (1985) model.
We can cite Subrahmanyam(1991), Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994), Vitale
(1995), Zhang (2004) and Baruch (2004). Except Subrahmanyam(1991), in
most of the discrete models, the comparative analysis studies were found
numerically. Indeed, the introduction of the risk-aversion type of the insider
makes the computational analysis quite complex. Subrahmanyam(1991)
which extended the Kyle (1985) model to the case of partially informed insid-
ers, succeeded to prove analytically, many of her comparative analysis with
respect to the risk-neutral case. Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) extended
Kyle's (1985) multi-period auction model to include multiple risk-averse in-
formed trader with long-lived information. Vitale (1995) generalized Kyle's
(1985) model to the case in which the informed trader is risk-averse where
the solution methods are based on LEQG dynamic programming problems.
Tighe (1989) extended Kyle model to multiple informed traders, all risk-
neutral. None of these extensions, studied the case with multiple informed
traders with dierent risk attitudes.
This paper, is the rst to our knowledge, to investigate the eect of risk at-
titudes on the nancial decisions of two insiders trading in the stock market.
We consider a static version of the Kyle (1985) model with two insiders. In-
sider 1 is risk neutral while insider 2 is risk averse with negative exponential
utility. Like Subrahmanyam(1991), we analytically prove the existence of a
linear Bayesian equilibrium and provide all the comparative statics analy-
sis results with respect to the duopoly static model of Holden and Subrah-
manyam(1994) and to the risk-neutral insiders duopoly case studied in Tighe
(1989).
It should be pointed out to the reader that in the risk-neutral case, the
normality distribution of the exogenous variables together with the linear
structure of the stock price, simplies the existence and the characterization
of the linear Bayesian equilibrium. Thus, the comparative statics becomes
straightforward. However, when the risk-aversion structure is introduced,
1For a detailed reference, the reader can check O'Hara (1995) or Ardalan (1998). Recent
extensions papers which considered risk-neutrality of the insider, include Jain and Mirman
(1999), Daher and Mirman(2007), Liang and Lin (2010), Wang, Wang and Ren (2009),
Daher, Karam and Mirman (2012), and Daher, Mirman and Saleeby (2014).
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the computation of the linear Bayesian equilibrium becomes dicult and the
analysis turns to be more complex. In this paper we solve such complexity
and provide exact result for the equilibrium outcomes as well as the compar-
ative statics analysis.
Our ndings reveal the impact of the risk attitudes on the equilibrium out-
comes. First, we show that the risk-aversion coecient A has a direct eect
on the trading order of the risk-neutral insider. Second, the dierent types
of risk attitudes, induce a non symmetric equilibrium trading orders. Third,
we nd that the market depth parameter  in this paper is greater than
the market depth parameter in Tighe (1989) model,i.e. when the two in-
siders are risk-neutral. However, the comparison between the market depth
parameter  in our paper and the market depth parameter in Holden and
Subrahmanyam(1994) is not straightforward. We show how the the risk-
aversion coecient is a fundamental determinant of this comparison. Fi-
nally, we study the impact of dierent risk attitudes on the price revelation.
We show that the equilibrium price in our model reveals more (less) informa-
tion than the stock price in Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) (Tighe (1989))
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we describe the model and
characterize the unique linear Bayesian equilibrium of the model. In section
3, we conduct a comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium outcomes
with respect to Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) and Tighe (1989). All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a static version of the Kyle (1985) model with two insiders. The
economy consists of one nancial asset. The underlying value of the asset is
denoted ~z. The prior distribution of ~z is normal with meanz (assumed to be
positive) and variance 2z . The two insiders exhibit dierent attitudes toward
risk. We assume that insider 1 is risk neutral while insider 2 is risk averse
with negative exponential utility and risk-aversion coecient A expressed as:
U(x) =  e Ax:
The two insiders trade in the stock market based on their inside information.
There are three types of agents. First, there are two rational insiders, each
of whom knows the realization z of ~z. Second, there are the (nonrational)
noise traders, representing small investors with no information on z: The ag-
gregate noise trade is assumed to be a random variable ~u, which is normally
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distributed with mean zero and variance 2u. Finally, there are K(K  2)
risk-neutral market makers who act like Bertrand competitors. We assume,
as in Kyle (1985), that the market makers observe the total order ow signal.
We assume that ~z, and ~u are independent.
Following Kyle (1985), the trading mechanism is organized in two steps. In
step one, a linear pricing rule and optimal order rules are determined by
the market makers and the insiders, respectively, as a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium. The market makers determine a (linear) pricing rule p, based on
their a priori beliefs, where p is a measurable function p : R  ! R. Each
insider chooses a stock trade function ~xi = xi(~z), where xi : R  ! R is a
measurable function. In the second step, the insiders observe the realization
z 2 of ~z and submit their stock orders to the market makers based on the
equilibrium stock trade functions. The market makers also receive orders
from the noise traders, all these orders arrive as a total order ow signal
~y = x1(~z) + x2(~z) + ~u = x(~z) + ~u. The order ow signal is used by the
market makers to set the price ~p = p(~y), based on the equilibrium price
function, to clear the market. The insiders know only the value of ~z and do
not know the values of ~u; ~y before their order ow decisions are made. More-
over, each market maker does not know the realization z of ~z but only knows
its distribution. Finally, the market makers cannot observe either x1; x2 or u.
The prots for each of the two rational traders are given, respectively, by
1 := (~z   p)  ~x1 and 2 := (~z   p)  ~x2
This is a game of incomplete information because the market makers unlike
the insiders do not know the realization of ~z. Hence, we seek for a Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium dened as follows,
Denition 1 A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is a vector of three functions
[x1(:); x2(:); p(:)] such that:
(a) Prot maximization of the risk neutral insider, i.e. insider 1,
E[(~z   p(x1(~z) + x2(~z) + ~u))x1(~z)]
 E[(~z   p(x01(~z) + x2(z) + ~u))x01(~z)] (1)
for any alternative trading strategy x01(~z);
2Random variables are denoted with a tilde. Realized values lack the tilde. The mean
of the random variable is denoted with bar.
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(b) Prot maximization of the risk-averse insider, i.e. insider 2,
E[ e A(~z   p(x1(~z) + x2(~z) + ~u))x2(~z)]
 E[ e A(~z   p(x1(~z) + x02(~z) + ~u))x02(~z)] (2)
for any alternative trading strategy x02(~z);
(c) Semi-Strong Market Eciency: The pricing rule p(:) satises,
p(~y) = E[~zj~y] (3)
An equilibrium is linear if there exists constants  and , such that,
8 y; p(y) = + y: (4)
Note that conditions (1), (2) dene optimal strategies of the two insiders
while condition (3) guarantees the zero expected prots for the market mak-
ers. The stock price, set by the market makers, is equal to the conditional
expectation of the asset value given their information. We restrict our study
to linear equilibrium. The normal distributions of the exogenous random
variables, enable us to derive and to prove the existence of a unique linear
equilibrium.
In the following Proposition, we characterize the unique linear equilibrium
of the model.
Proposition 1 In the presence of one risk neutral and one risk averse in-
formed traders, a linear equilibrium exists and it is unique. It is characterized
by,
(i) x1(~z) =
(~z   )(1 + A2u)
(3 + 2A2u)
and x2(~z) =
(~z   )
(3 + 2A2u)
(ii) p(~y) = + ~y; where  = z, and  is the unique strictly positive root
of the following quartic equation:
4A24u
4 + 12A2u
3 + (9  A22u2z)2   3A2z  2
2z
2u
= 0:
Proof : See Appendix A.
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Discussion of the equilibrium: First, note that the relationship between this
paper, Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) and Tighe (1989) should be clear.
Indeed, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) considered the case of two risk-
averse insiders. Moreover, Tighe (1989) considered the Kyle (1985) model
with two risk neutral insiders. Hence, our model can be seen as a hybrid-
model in comparison with Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) and with Tighe
(1989). Consequently, in this paper we will be able to show the eect of dif-
ferent risk-attitudes on equilibrium outcomes.
Second, it should be pointed out that our hybrid risk attitudes structure
aects the equilibrium trading orders. Proposition 1 shows that they are
not symmetric as in Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) and in Tighe (1989).
Specically, the risk neutral insider (insider 1) trades more (in absolute value)
than the risk-averse insider (insider 2). Although both insiders are fully in-
formed about the realization z of the risky asset, we notice that the risk
neutrality dominates the risk-aversion in term of trading.
Third, Proposition 1 reveals the role of the strategic behaviors of the two
insiders. Indeed, the order of the risk-neutral insider (insider 1) depends on
the risk-aversion coecient A. Insider 1 takes into account all the possible
decisions of insider 2 in her maximization problem.
Fourth, as in Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994), our model reduces to the
case of two risk-neutral insiders, i.e. it converges to the Tighe (1989) model
when the risk-aversion coecient A = 0. However, Proposition 1 reveals very
interesting results about the risk tolerance eect on the insiders trades, when
the total order ow signal is too noisy (2u is large). Indeed, in this case, the
order of the risk-averse insider is almost close to zero while the order of risk
neutral insider is close to the one in Kyle (1985). In other words, when the
signal is too noisy, the risk-averse insider responds less aggressively to such
increase and thus decides not to trade. Hence, the model is reduced to the
single risk-neutral insider. Consequently, the insider order converges to the
one in the risk-neutral monopolistic case (Kyle 1985).
Since in both Tighe (1989) and Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) papers,
insiders are either risk neutral or risk averse, the equilibrium trades are equal
and thus the impact of the noise is the same on both insiders' trades. How-
ever, in our model, we see that the strategic behavior of the insiders together
with their risk attitudes, drive the insider to take dierent positions of trades
depending on their information.
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Fifth, it is noteworthy to consider the case when insider 2 is too risk-averse
(A is large). In this case, Proposition 1 shows that the risk-averse insider
(insider 2) has no incentive to trade (x2(~z) = 0). Consequently the model
converges to the one risk-neutral Kyle (1985) model, and the order of insider
1 is equal to the one in Kyle (1985).
Finally, it should be pointed out that the risk-averse property has a direct
eect on the computation of the equilibrium outcomes and more specically
on the market depth parameter . Indeed, considering the static version of
Kyle (1985) and its extensions when the insiders are risk neutral3, we noticed
that the market depth parameter is directly computed. On the other hand,
when insiders are risk-averse, the market depth  is the solution of a quartic
equation.4
In the next section we develop the comparative static analysis. We will ana-
lyze the market depth and the stock price informativeness compared to their
corresponding expressions in Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) and Tighe
(1989).
3 Comparative Statics
3.1 market depth parameter 
In this section, we compare our market depth parameter  to the ones in
Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) and Tighe (1989). Lemma 1 shows that
market depth in Tighe (1989) is higher than our model. However, the relation
with respect to Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) is not straightforward.
Indeed,
Lemma 1 The market depth parameter  in our model is greater than the
market depth in Tighe (1989). However, the relation with respect to Holden
and Subrahmanyam(1994) is ambiguous and given as follows.
(i)
T  
3See for example Tighe (1989),Jain and Mirman (1999), Daher and Mirman (2007),
Wang et al (2009), Daher, Karam and Mirmam (2012).
4See for example Vitale (1995), Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994), Subrah-
manyam(1991), Zhang (2004).
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(ii) There exists a risk-aversion coecient level A such that,8<:
 > HS forall A < A
 < HS forall A > A
(5)
where T and HS refer to the market depth parameters in Tighe (1989) and
Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) respectively.
Proof : See Appendix B.
Note that Lemma 1 plays a central key in providing all the results in this
section. In all the papers which extended the static Kyle (1985) models with
risk neutral insiders, the parameter  was explicitly characterized as a func-
tion of the exogenous variables of these models. However, in the presence
of risk aversion, the market depth parameter is implicitly characterized as
a solution of a quartic equation.5 Thus, most of the comparative results in
the literature, were made numerically. However, in our paper, the results of
Lemma 1 are proved analytically and it will be used as foundation to subse-
quent results of this paper.
Lemma 1 shows the impact of dierent risk attitudes on the market depth
parameter . The rst part of the Lemma shows that the market depth
parameter is greater in our model than in Tighe (1989). In other words,
when the two insiders are risk neutral (Tighe 1989), the market is deeper
(as dened by Kyle (1985) to be 1

) than the market in the presence of one
risk-averse insider (our model). Hence, the risk-averse insider together with
the strategic behavior of the risk-neutral insider, drive them to trade more
aggressively and thus reducing the market liquidity than in Tighe (1989).
However, the comparison between the market depth parameters in our pa-
per and in Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) model seems to be ambiguous
and not intuitive. Indeed, one expects that the presence of the risk-neutral
insider in our paper will increase the market liquidity. but the second part of
Lemma 1 shows the existence of a unique risk aversion coecient, A, before
which the market depth parameter in our model is less than the market depth
5See Subrahmanyam(1991), Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994), Vitale (1995) and many
related papers.
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parameter in the presence of two risk averse insiders (Holden and Subrah-
manyam(1994) model). Moreover, for the values of risk aversion coecients
greater than A, the market depth parameter in our model is greater than
the market depth parameter in the presence of two risk averse insiders. Thus,
the risk aversion coecient is a principal determinant of market liquidity.
To better understand the eect of risk aversion on the market depth param-
eter, we decide to derive in Table 1, the  values6 in the following cases:
a- V corresponds to market depth parameter in the case of a single risk-
averse insider (Vitale 1995).
b- HS corresponds to market depth parameter in the case of two risk-averse
insiders both knowing the underlying value of the risky asset ~z (Holden and
Subrahmanyam(1994)).
c-  corresponds to the market depth parameter in the case of one risk neu-
tral and one risk averse insiders knowing the underlying value of the risky
asset ~z (our model).
Note that when A = 0, V corresponds to  in Kyle (1985). Similarly in
our model and in Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) model, when A = 0, we
retrieve T (Tighe 1989).
Table 1 shows that in the presence of one risk-averse insider (Vitale 1995),
 is always less than the one in the case of risk-neutral insider (Kyle 1985).
This result is reversed when we compare our model's market depth parame-
ter  to T (part (i) of Lemma 1). Consequently, the eect of risk-neutrality
on the market depth dominates the eect of the risk-aversion on the market
depth, when we add another risk neutral insider to Kyle 1985 model (Tighe
1989) and to Vitale 1995 model (our model).
Part (ii) of Lemma 1 shows how the eect of risk-aversion on the market
depth parameter is crucial when we compare our hybrid duopoly model to the
risk-aversion duopoly model of Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994). First note
that going from the risk-aversion monopoly case (Vitale 1995) to the risk-
aversion duopoly case (Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994)), Table 1 shows
that the market depth parameter is not monotonic and more specically, it
is unimodal with respect to the risk-aversion coecient. Thus the impact of
risk-aversion on the market depth is the key of the relation.
6For a better comparison, we consider the same Table as in Vitale (1995) page 7, and
add to it the case when the risk aversion coecient A = 4 which is considered in Holden
and Subrahmanyam(1994).
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Table 1: Comparison of the market depth parameter 
2z = 1, 
2
u = 1
A 0 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.33 0.5 1 2 4
V 0.5 0.4999 0.4998 0.4994 0.4986 0.4969 0.4902 0.4735 0.4416
HS 0.4714 0.4732 0.4750 0.4782 0.4820 0.4862 0.4947 0.5 0.4905
 0.4714 0.4723 0.4732 0.4748 0.4767 0.4789 0.4839 0.4897 0.4948
2z = 1, 
2
u = 2
A 0 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.33 0.5 1 2 4
V 0.3536 0.3535 0.3533 0.3528 0.3516 0.3496 0.3419 0.3250 0.2969
HS 0.3333 0.3351 0.3368 0.3399 0.3432 0.3468 0.3524 0.3520 0.3375
 0.3333 0.3342 0.3351 0.3366 0.3383 0.3403 0.3442 0.3482 0.3512
It should be pointed out that Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994) focused on
the eect of the dynamic structure of trading and compared their results to
the Kyle model. However, in the static case with 2 insiders, the relation
between HS and T is quite similar to the relation between HS and .
In sum, the relation between the market depth parameters in the case of
monopoly (Vitale 1994 and Kyle 1985) is monotonic but it does not hold
when we consider the duopoly case (Tighe 1989 and Holden and Subrah-
manyam 1994).7
Consequently, we show that the market liquidity is directly aected not only
by the number of trading rounds (Holden and Subrahmanyam 1994) or the
number of informed traders (Subrahmanyam(1991)), but also by the risk
attitudes of the insiders.
3.2 Information Revelation
In this section we discuss the information revelation in our model and com-
pare to Tighe (1989) and Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994). By adopting the
same measure of information, i.e. the conditional variance of the liquidation
asset value given the total order ow, we obtain the following result.
7Subrahmanyam(1991) found the same result with nite number of partially informed
traders and analyzed the impact of the number of the insiders on the market depth pa-
rameter.
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Proposition 2 The equilibrium price reveals less information in the pres-
ence of 1 risk-neutral and 1 risk-averse insiders (our model) than in the
presence of two risk-neutral insiders (Tighe 1989). However, with two risk-
averse insiders ( Holden and Subrahmanyam 1994), the equilibrium price is
less revealing than in our model.
Proposition 2 highlights the impact of risk attitude on price informativeness.
First, it should be noted that the hybrid structure of the risk attitudes of
the insiders does not alter the relation of the price informativeness. Indeed,
Proposition 2 shows that risk-neutrality increase price revelation of informa-
tion with respect to risk aversion. This results holds in Vitale (1995) model
which considered the risk-averse monopolistic case and compared the price
revelation to the result in Kyle (1985). For the duopoly case, Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1994) also obtained the same result as well.
Similar to Subrahmanyam (1991), we found two common results related to
price eciency. First note that an increase in the variance of liquidity trad-
ing, decreases the price eciency. This similarity shows that the presence of
the risk-averse insider has more eect on the price eciency than the risk
neutral insider does. Second, it should be pointed out that price eciency
is decreasing in the risk-aversion coecient. In other words, when insider 2,
becomes more risk-averse (increasing the risk-aversion coecient), her trades
are more and more less aggressive. This eect has a direct increase on the
market depth parameter  (Lemma 1, part II) and thus reducing the price
eciency.
Finally, it is worth noting that our model highlights the impact of the risk
attitudes on the price eciency. Indeed, although one of the insiders is
risk neutral, the price eciency is directly aected by the risk-averse insider
behavior.
Appendices
Appendix A: proof of Proposition 1
We begin by the maximization problem of the risk neutral insider, i.e. insider
1. The decision rule of insider 1 is the the function x1(~z). The expected
prots after plugging the linear pricing function, become,
E[(~z   p(x1(~z) + x2(~z) + ~u))x1(~z)] = E[(~z     (x1(~z) + x2(~z) + ~u))x1(~z)]
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The rst and the second order conditions are
x1(~z) =
z     x2(~z)
2
and  > 0: (6)
We move now to solve the maximization of the risk averse insider, i.e. insider
2. The decision rule of insider 2 is the the function x2(~z)). The expected
prots after plugging the linear pricing function, become,
E[ e A(~z p(x1(~z)+x2(~z)+~u))x2(~z)j~z] = E[ e A(~z  (x1(~z)+x2(~z)+~u))x2(~z)j~z]
Using the normality and the independency of the noise traders'orders ~u, the
rst and the second order condition are
x2(~z) =
z     x1(~z)
(2 + A2u)
and (2 + A2u) > 0: (7)
Combining equations 6 and 7, we obtain
x1(~z) =
(z   )(1 + A2u)
(3 + 2A2u)
and x2(~z) =
(z   )
(3 + 2A2u)
(8)
Regarding the price function coecients,  and , rst note that the semi-
strong market eciency together with linear price function assumption lead
to,
+ ~r = E[~zj~r] (9)
Evaluating the expectation on both sides of equation 9 and then applying
the law of iterated expectations, we obtain
+ r = z (10)
Where r = x1 + x2 + u = x1 + x2. Using equation 8 to nd the expression of
r and plugging the result in equation 10, we obtain
 = z (11)
To complete the proof, it remains to nd a unique value of the price function
slope . Indeed, note that the linear expressions of the insiders strategies
decisions, ~x1 and ~x2, induce the normality distribution of the total order ow
~r. Thus, by applying the projection theorem to equation 9, we have
 =
cov(~z; ~r)
var(~r)
(12)
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Evaluating the right-hand side of equation 12 and after certain arrangement
we nd that  is a root of the following quadric equation
4A24u
4 + 12A2u
3 + (9  A22u2z)2   3A2z  2
2z
2u
= 0: (13)
By Descartes' rule of signs,8 there is only one positive root satisfying the
second order condition which ends the proof.
Appendix B: proof of Lemma 1
First, recall that the market depth parameter in Tighe (1989) is given by
T =
p
2
3
z
u
which corresponds to our market depth parameter when A = 0.
Thus, if we show that  is increasing in A, then the rst part of the lemma
will be proved. We begin by proving the following lemma
Lemma 2  2 [
p
2
3
z
u
; 1
2
z
u
]
Proof : The Proof is divided in two parts.
Part I: In this part we show that  =
1
2
z
u
is an asymptote in the (A; )
plane. To nd the asymptote, we view the quartic (equation 13)
f (;A) = 4A24u
4+12A2u
3+
 
9  A22u2z

2  3A2z  2
2z
2u
= 0; (14)
as a plane algebraic curve.
Note that most of the curves represented by f (;A; z; u) are irreducible.
We work under this assumption. The projective curve corresponding to the
ane curve f = 0 is
F (;A; Z) = 4A24u
4+12A2u
3Z2+
 
9Z4   A22u2zZ2

2 3A2zZ4 2
2z
2u
Z6 = 0:
(15)
8(Theorem: Descartes'rule of signs) If the terms of a single variable polynomial
with real coecients are ordered by descending variable exponent, then the number of
positive roots of the polynomial is either equal to the number of sign dierences between
consecutive nonzero coecients, or less than it by a multiple of two
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It is not dicult to see that this projective curve has the singular points
(0 : 1 : 0) and (1 : 0 : 0) :
Now we consider the ane view Z = 1: Put Z = 0 into the equation (15)
to get A24 = 0: So the points (1 : 0 : 0) and (0 : 1 : 0) are at innity. The
second of these points is on the A-axis, and as noted above it is singular. Set
A = 1 in the equation of the projective curve (15), we thus obtain the ane
curve
44u
4 + 122u
3Z2 +
 
9Z4   2u2zZ2

2   32zZ4   2
2z
2u
Z6 = 0:
The lower order terms 44u
4   2u2zZ22 give us the distinct tangents  =
0;  = 1
2
z
Z
u
;  =  1
2
z
Z
u
: Now dehomogenize to obtain, for  > 0; the ane
asymptote  = z
2u
:
Next we show the the curve will not cross its asymptote. The equation of
the ane curve above (14) can be written as
 
42u
2   2z
 
2uA+ 3

A+
2
2u

=  2 < 0:
This then implies that 42u
2   2z < 0; and so  < z2u for  > 0:
Part II: In this part of the proof, we show that  is increasing with respect
to A where u and z are treated as parameters. By implicit dierentiation,
we obtain
d
dA
=  
@f
@A
@f
@
;
where @f
@
must not be zero. It is then simple to nd that
d
dA
=
 8A4u4   122u3 + 2A2u2z2 + 32z
16A24u
3 + 36A2u
2 + 2 (9  A22u2z)  3A2z
:
Note that the numerator has one positive root - by Descartes' rule (since we
are interested in A  0). Now factor the expression, and so we have
d
dA
=
  (2u  z) (2u+ z) (2A2u + 3)
(2A2u + 3) (8A
2
u
2 + 6  A2z)
=   (2u  z) 2u+ z
8A2u
2 + 6  A2z
14
Set d
dA
= 0:We then see that the only positive critical point is obtained when
 = z
2u
, which is independent of A: Clearly, d
dA
> 0 if 2u   z < 0, or
 < z
2u
; and provided that 8A2u
2 + 6  A2z > 0:
Now, note that the roots of this expression 8A2u
2 + 6   A2z = 0 are
 = 1
8A2u

 3p(9 + 8A22u2z) :
Discard the negative root, and then carry out a sign chart for  > 0: Consider
the upper bound (from part I) to see what is the value of f (;A) for this
value of : The evaluation gives that,
4A24u

z
2u
4
+12A2u

z
2u
3
+
 
9  A22u2z
 z
2u
2
 3A2z

z
2u

 2
2
z
2u
=
1
4
2z
2u
> 0:
On the other hand, for  =
p
2z
3u
; we have
4A24u
 p
2z
3u
!4
+ 12A2u
 p
2z
3u
!3
+
 
9  A22u2z
 p2z
3u
!2
  3A2z
 p
2z
3u
!
  2
2
z
2u
=   1
81
3z
A
u

2Azu + 9
p
2

< 0:
This shows that the unique root is bracketed between
p
2z
3u
and z
2u
(by the
Intermediate Value Theorem).
To complete the proof, it remains to show that
p
2z
3u
  1
8A2u

 3 +p(9 + 8A22u2z) >
0 or equivalently
8
p
2Azu
3
+ 3 >
p
(9 + 8A22u
2
z)

:
By the positivity of the expressions, we have 
8
p
2Azu
3
+ 3
!2
 
p
(9 + 8A22u
2
z)
2
=
56
9
A22u
2
z + 16
p
2Azu;
which is clearly > 0. This shows that the positive root in the quadratic
8A2u
2 + 6 A2z expression is lower than the lower bound
p
2z
3u
of ; the
solution f (;A) = 0:
Next we show part (b) of Lemma 1. We begin by recalling the one-shot game
equilibrium of the Holden-Subrahmanyam (1994) model.
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Proposition 3 (H.S. 1994) In the presence of two risk averse informed
traders, a linear equilibrium exists and it is unique. It is characterized by,
(i)
x1(~z) = x2(~z) =
(~z   )
HS(3 + AHS2u)
(16)
(ii) p(~y) =  + HS~y; where  = z, and HS is the unique strictly positive
root of the following quadric equation:
A24u
4 + 6A2u
3 + 92   2A2z  2
2z
2u
= 0: (17)
We move now to prove the relation between  and HS. Note that (17) can
also be considered as an algebraic curve g (A; ;u; z) = 0; where u and z
as viewed as parameters. By implicit dierentiation, we obtain
d
dA
=  
@g
@A
@g
@
;
where @g
@
must not be zero. Thus, we have
d
dA
=
  (2A4u4 + 62u3   22z)
4A24u
3 + 18A2u
2 + 18  2A2z
:
Note that the numerator has one positive root - by Descartes' rule (since we
are interested in A  0); and we can write this equation as
d
dA
=
  (22u (A2u + 3)  2z)
 (A2u + 3) (2A
2
u + 3)  A2z
:
Observe that d
dA
= 0; implies that

 
22u
 
A2u + 3
  2z = 0:
Solving this equation for A; gives A =   1
3
322u 2z
4u
: Put this expression for
A into the quartic to nd ; we then obtain  = 1
2
z
u
or  =  1
2
z
u
: Since
 > 0; we see that g (A; ) = 0; for
(A; ) =

  1
3
322u 2z
4u
; 1
2
z
u

=

  1
( 12
z
u
)
3
3( 12
z
u
)
2
2u 2z
4u
; 1
2
z
u

=

2
zu
; 1
2
z
u

:
On the other hand, solve (17) forA to obtainA = 1
234u

 622u + 22z  2
p
( 422u2z + 4z)

.
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In order to have real roots, we need  422u2z+4z  0; that is  422u2z+4z
= 2z (2u   z) (2u + z)  0; or equivalently, (2u   z) (2u + z) 
0: This means that (2u   z)  0, that is   12 zu :
So this bound is the maximal value of : By the analysis above, this happens
when A = 2
zu
: We now study the sign of d
dA
: Evaluate d
dA
at A = 0: We get
d
dA
jA=0 =   (6
2
u
3   22z)
18
=  1
3
22u +
1
9
2z :
Now when A = 0 , g (0; ) = 92   22z
2u
= 0, which has the solutions  =
1
3
p
2 z
u
: Since  > 0; we get that
d
dA
jA=0 =   (6
2
u
3   22z)
18
=  1
3

1
3
p
2
z
u
2
2u +
1
9
2z =
1
27
2z > 0:
On the other hand, one can show that the d
dA
jA= 3
zu
< 0. Thus, the deriva-
tive at A = 0 is positive, and to the right of A at A = 3
zu
is negative. This
shows that the plane curve described by g (A; ) = 0; has a max given by
(A; ) =

2
zu
; 1
2
z
u

: So we can conclude that the algebraic curve g = 0
is unimodal. In fact, this can be veried by computing the second deriva-
tive of lambda with respect to A, which evaluates at

2
uz
; z
2u

, is equal to
  1
128
(z)
3(u) < 0: This shows that it is concave down on the region con-
taining the maximum point.
Now, computing the rst derivative of  with respect to A when A = 0, we
obtain
d
dA
jA=0 =  1
6
(2u   z) (2u + z)
=  1
6

2

1
3
p
2
z
u

u   z

2

1
3
p
2
z
u

u + z

=   1
54
2z

2
p
2  3

2
p
2 + 3

=
2z
54
> 0
This show that that the initial slope in Holden and Subrahmanyam(1994)
case is exactly twice of that obtained in our case.
Consider now the dierence h = g   f , we get
h (A; ) = A
  3A34u   622u + 2z + A2u2z
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So to nd the intersection of f and g; h must vanish. Then either A = 0
or  3A34u  622u + 2z +A2u2z = 0: The cubic polynomial has one sign
change, and therefore, it has one positive root by Descarte's sign rule.
We show in the table below that at A = 3
zu
; f < g; but that at A = 4
zu
;
f > g: It also shows the intersection point .
nA 3
zu
4
zu
3:5
zu
 from f = 0 : 492 91 z
u
: 494 81 z
u
: 493 97 z
u
 from g = 0 : 497 z
u
: 490 51 z
u
: 494 02 z
u
Note that the intersection point is roughly (A; ) =

3:5
zu
; : 494 z
u

.
Summarizing, we have that
1) the initial slope of g is bigger than the initial slope of f ;
2) g is unimodal, it has one critical point which is a maximum occuring
at A = 2
uz
;
3) the intersection point of f and g occurs to the right of the maximum
of g; at roughly A ' 3:5
uz
;
4) h = 0 at two points.
Then it follows that there is one point (A; ) ; where  < HS for A < A;
and  > HS for A > A
:
Appendix C: proof of Proposition 2
Recall that the conditional variance in Tighe (1989) is given by
var(~zj~y) = 1
3
2z (18)
Computing the conditional variances in our model and in the Holden-Subrahmanyam(1994)
model, we obtain respectively
var(~zj~y) = (3k
2 + 2k)2z   2(2k + 1)22u
(2k + 1)2
; (19)
where k = 1 + A2u; and
var(~zj~y) = [(3 + A
2
u)
2   4]2z   2(3 + A2u)22u
(3 + A2u)
2
: (20)
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We begin rst by showing that (18) is less than (19). Indeed, combining (19)
with (13) and after some simplications, the problem becomes equivalent to
showing that
1
3
<
3 + 5A2u + 2
2A24u
(2 (1 + A2u) + 1)
2 : (21)
Plugging the lower (upper) bound of  found in Lemma 2 in the numerator
(denominator) of the right hand side of (21), we obtain,
3 + 5A2u
p
2
3
z
u

+ 2
p
2
3
z
u
2
A24u
2

1 + A

z
2u

2u

+ 1
2 < 3 + 5A2u + 22A24u(2 (1 + A2u) + 1)2 :
The left hand side simplies to
1
3
+
  
15
p
2  18Auz + 2z2uA2
9 (3 + Azu)
2 >
1
3
:
This completes the rst part of the proof. It remains to show that the
conditional variance in our model is less than the conditional variance in
Holden and Subrahmanyam model (1994). Indeed, combining (19) with (13)
and combining (20) with (17), the problem reduces to showing that
1 + A2u
3 + 2A2u
 A
HS2u + 1
AHS2u + 3
: (22)
In order to complete the proof, we need to show rst the following result.
Lemma 3 HS 2
h
z
4u
; z
2u
i
Proof: Consider the equation
g() = A24u
4 + 6A2u
3 + 92   2A2z  2
2z
2u
; (23)
such that g(HS) = 0. Note that
g

z
4u

= A24u

z
4u
4
+ 6A2u

z
4u
3
+ 9

z
4u
2
  2A2z

z
4u

  2
2
z
2u
=
1
256
A24z  
13
32
A
u
3z  
23
16
2z
2u
=
1
256
2z
A22z
2
u   104Azu   368
2u
:
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Consider the numerator A22z
2
u   104Azu   368 = 0. It has the solutions
A = 413+8
p
3
zu
= 107: 43
zu
or A = 413 8
p
3
zu
=  3: 425 6
zu
: Now, the derivative
d

1
256
2z
A22z
2
u 104Azu 368
2u

dA
=
1
128
3z
u
(Azu   52) :
So for 0  A < 52
zu
, the derivative is negative and g

z
4u

(at this value
only) is decreasing in A for 0  A < 52
zu
. As also for A = 0; g

z
4u

=
9

z
4u
2
  22z
2u
=  23
16
2z
2u
is negative, we can conclude that z
4u
is a lower
bound for . Similarly, it follows from what we had before,
A24u

z
2u
4
+ 6A2u

z
2u
3
+ 9

z
2u
2
  2A2z

z
2u

  2
2
z
2u
=
1
16
2z
A22z
2
u   4Azu + 4
2u
=
1
16
2z
(Azu   2)2
2u
> 0:
Thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, the proof of Lemma 3 is complete.
We turn now to show that (22) holds. Since the expressions in (22) are both
monotone increasing in , plugging the lower bound of Lemma 3 in the right
hand side of (22) ; and plugging the upper bound of Lemma 3 in the left
hand side of (22) , and then subtracting the resulting expressions from each
others, we obtain
1
2
2 + Azu
3 + Azu
  Azu + 4
Azu + 12
=  1
2
(Azu)
2
(3 + Azu) (Azu + 12)
< 0: (24)
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
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